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Abstract
This article is the third in a three-part review of research on globalization and the social
determinants of health (SDH). In the first article of the series, we identified and defended an
economically oriented definition of globalization and addressed a number of important conceptual
and metholodogical issues. In the second article, we identified and described seven key clusters of
pathways relevant to globalization's influence on SDH. This discussion provided the basis for the
premise from which we begin this article: interventions to reduce health inequities by way of SDH
are inextricably linked with social protection, economic management and development strategy.
Reflecting this insight, and against the background of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
we focus on the asymmetrical distribution of gains, losses and power that is characteristic of
globalization in its current form and identify a number of areas for innovation on the part of the
international community: making more resources available for health systems, as part of the more
general task of expanding and improving development assistance; expanding debt relief and taking
poverty reduction more seriously; reforming the international trade regime; considering the
implications of health as a human right; and protecting the policy space available to national
governments to address social determinants of health, notably with respect to the hypermobility
of financial capital. We conclude by suggesting that responses to globalization's effects on social
determinants of health can be classified with reference to two contrasting visions of the future,
reflecting quite distinct values.
Background
This article is the third in a three-part review of research on
globalization and the social determinants of health
(SDH). In the first article of the series, we identified and
defended an economically oriented definition of globali-
zation and addressed a number of important conceptual
and methodological issues. In the second article, we iden-
tified and described seven key clusters of pathways rele-
vant to globalization's influence on SDH. This discussion
provided the basis for the premise from which we begin
this article: interventions to reduce health inequities by
way of SDH are inextricably linked with social protection
policy, economic management and development strategy.
It follows that when the objective is to reduce health ineq-
uities by way of SDH, the scale at which an intervention
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must be implemented is not necessarily the scale at which
the problem arises. For example, addressing the poverty of
individuals and households may demand policy
responses on the part of state/provincial and national gov-
ernments, yet they may be limited in their ability to act
effectively because of constraints that are created by, and
can best be changed by, actors outside their national bor-
ders, such as multilateral institutions or institutional
investors. This interconnectedness is a distinguishing
characteristic of contemporary globalization, and pro-
vides the basis for Pogge's argument that the industrial-
ized world has an ethical obligation to reduce poverty
outside its own borders [1]. We do not mean here to write
domestic political action out of the picture; far from it.
Szreter's work on industrializing England shows that the
formation of effective domestic political coalitions was
necessary to the translation of economic growth into
improved population health status [2-4]. However glo-
balization shapes the environment within which such
coalitions operate, and affects their chances of success in a
variety of ways.
In 2000, a resolution of the UN General Assembly com-
mitted the international community to achieving the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs), by the year 2015
in most cases. Three of the Goals, which involve reducing
child and maternal mortality and reversing the spread of
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other communicable diseases, are
explicitly health-related. Four others directly address cru-
cial social determinants of (ill) health: extreme poverty,
undernourishment, environmental hazards, and lack of
access to education. Targets that have been developed
with respect to each of the goals state more specific mile-
stones, such as reducing by half the proportion of the
world's people without safe drinking water [5]
The MDGs arguably represent a 'first' in terms of commit-
ments by the international community to a specific devel-
opment agenda. They are unambitious when viewed
against the sheer volume of unmet basic human needs.
Particularly notable is the modesty of the poverty reduc-
tion target (reducing by half, in the year 2015, the propor-
tion of the world's people living on less than $1/day)
when viewed against the background of expanding global
affluence [6]. Similarly, compare the MDG 7 target of
improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers per year
by 2020 with the estimate that if present trends continue,
1.4 billion people worldwide will live in slums in 2020
[7]. A further problem is that, apart from MDG 3 on gen-
der equity in education, the MDGs are stated in terms of
societal averages – meaning that a country may be able to
achieve MDG targets related to health, such as under-5
mortality, while failing to improve the health status of the
worst-off groups [8,9].
On the other hand, the MDGs are ambitious when viewed
against the uneven pace of recent progress toward meeting
the needs they address. Substantial progress has been
made toward achieving the MDG targets in some regions.
In others, especially sub-Saharan Africa, the situation is
grim [10,11]. Recent syntheses of available evidence,
notably those by the UK Commission on Africa and the
UN Millennium Project, describe an emerging consensus
that if the MDG targets or comparable improvements in
human well being are to be achieved, then substantial
long-term commitments of additional resources by the
industrialized countries are necessary [12,13]; see also
[14](p. 190–192). Because an increasingly dense network
of trade and investment flows links rich and poor across
national borders, achieving the MDGs or comparable
goals will also require revamping the trade and foreign
policies of the industrialized world to ensure compatibil-
ity with progress toward the MDGs and other objectives
related to basic needs, and to address the "asymmetrical"
distribution of gains, losses and power that is characteris-
tic of globalization in its current form, [15,16] as noted in
the second article of the series.
Several elements of that asymmetry are directly relevant to
issues of global governance. In the case of trade policy, for
instance, many developing countries cannot afford the
professional expertise that is needed to participate effec-
tively in multiple trade negotiations and to pursue dispute
resolution [17] – creating a strong case based on fairness
for expanded assistance in capacity building. It is more
difficult to get around the asymmetry created by differ-
ences in market size as they affect not only initial bargain-
ing positions but also the ability to make use of dispute
resolution even when the outcome is favourable. "The
sanction for violating a WTO agreement is the imposition
of duties. If Ecuador, say, were to impose a duty on goods
that it imports from the United States, it would have a
negligible effect on the American producer; while if the
United States were to impose a duty on goods produced
by Ecuador, the economic impact is more likely to be dev-
astating" [18](p. 504).
There follows a generic overview of key policy imperatives
and opportunities. It is incomplete in at least three
respects. First, it focuses on policy actions at the interna-
tional level, rather than on mitigative or compensatory
policies that can be adopted at the national or subnational
level, apart from a discussion of the extent to which the
international economic and political context creates con-
straints that limit the ability of governments to adopt such
policies. Second, it does not address some important gov-
ernance issues raised by changing distribution of power
and economic resources outside the industrialized world
– exemplified by the rise of China and, to a lesser extent,
India as global economic players [19] and by the emer-
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gence of world-scale resource corporations like Brazilian-
based Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, which recently
acquired Canadian mining giant Inco Ltd. Third, it focuses
on eliminating current barriers and constraints rather
than on opportunities associated with the potential emer-
gence of new forms and institutions of global governance.
Those opportunities represent an important area for
building research collaborations and communities of
practice that link development policy, clinical disciplines,
population health and social science fields such as inter-
national relations and political economy.
Making more resources available for equitable access to 
health systems
Health care and health systems are among the SDH, and
an immediate imperative is to make more resources avail-
able to deliver key interventions. The Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health estimated in 2001 that rou-
tinely providing a package of basic, relatively well under-
stood low-cost and low-tech interventions [20], costing
US $34 per capita per year and comprising "a rather min-
imal health system," could save "at least 8 million lives
each year by the end of this decade" [21](emphasis in orig-
inal). This figure must be compared with average national
health expenditure of $24 per capita in 2001 in jurisdic-
tions that the World Bank defines as low income coun-
tries, where 2.2 billion people live. In countries in which
half of those people live – more than a billion, in other
words – annual per capita spending on health was $14 per
capita or less, according to the World Bank's Health,
Nutrition and Population (HNP) database [22](accessed
May 9, 2006). Not all of this expenditure, of course,
involves services for the poor or otherwise vulnerable, and
not all of it is public spending: recall the pervasiveness of
"medical poverty traps" noted in the second article of this
series and consider that in Viet Nam, a country where pov-
erty induced by catastrophic illness is a major problem
[23], public health care expenditure stood at less than $4
per capita in 2001 [24] – reflecting a general and ironic
trend for private, out-of-pocket payment to comprise a
high proportion of total health expenditure in many of
the world's poorest countries.
The Commission on Macroeconomics and Health and,
more recently, the Commission for Africa and the UN Mil-
lennium Project all argued strongly for a several-fold
increase in the value of development assistance for health,
focused on basic interventions. The Commission for
Africa [12](p. 196) was also explicit in recommending
that elimination of user fees be supported by long-term
donor financing commitments – essential if the increased
use of services that follows the elimination of financial
barriers is not to create demands that already overstressed
public health systems cannot meet. The need for such
commitments underscores the fact that many low-income
countries will require substantial development assistance
for many years, probably for decades, if their health sys-
tems are to be financed at the minimum level identified
by the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health
[25,26]. The urgency of providing such additional
resources is clear and should not require further elabora-
tion, but one argument is worth citing. Economist Jeffrey
Sachs, who chaired both the Commission on Macroeco-
nomics and Health and the more recent Millennium
Project, has estimated [27] that the combination of low
per capita income and weak government institutions in
many tropical sub-Saharan African countries might be
capable of generating US$50/capita in total public reve-
nue. "This tiny sum must be divided among all govern-
ment functions ... [T]he health sector is lucky to claim $10
per person per year out of this, but even rudimentary
health care requires roughly four times that amount ....
Foreign aid is therefore not a luxury for African health. It
is a life-and-death necessity."
However, rich countries have so far not even lived up to
the rhetoric associated with their highest profile initiative
to increase support for health in the developing world.
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
was hailed at the 2001 G8 Summit as a "a quantum leap
in the fight against infectious diseases," yet the Fund con-
tinues to lack a long-term financing mechanism. It relies
instead on periodic replenishment meetings that in effect
involve passing a hat, and has estimated that it will need
$7.1 billion in 2006 and 2007 to fund new proposals and
continuations of existing work [28]. The September 2005
replenishment meeting raised the total value of funds
pledged for 2006–2007 to $3.73 billion, or just over half
the anticipated funding requirement for those years [29].
This creates serious constraints on what activities the Fund
can support even after scientific merit has been demon-
strated, since the Fund "can only approve grants if the full
amount required for the first two years is covered by
pledges from donors in the calendar year of the approval"
[28](p. 34). The Fund itself now estimates that future
funding requirements could be as high as $7–8 billion per
year [28](p. 32), and a stable source of long-term financ-
ing, such as a global trust fund, is still not in place.
Provision of public goods related to health presents dis-
tinctive problems. In common usage, the phrase "public
good" is often associated with the common welfare, or
with such values as equity and social justice. Its definition
in economic theory is more precise: a private good (either a
service or a good in the physical sense) is one whose indi-
vidual consumption is both excludable (my use of the
good is not dependent on others' use) and rivalrous (my
use of the good could preclude use by another). Con-
versely, a public good is one that is non-excludable (classic
illustrations are the order created by traffic lights and,
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from the days before GPS, the safety benefits of light-
houses) and, in pure form, is non-rivalrous (my use of the
traffic light, lighthouse or GPS signal in no way impairs
your use of it). Few pure public goods exist and public
policy choices, which may vary over time, often determine
the balance between private and public characteristics of a
good [30,31]. Although health itself is not a public good,
numerous public goods for health exist, including scien-
tific knowledge and communicable disease control. The
terminology of global public goods for health (GPGH) is
now in widespread use, but a recent WHO research initia-
tive [32] concluded that many public goods for health are
in fact regional, rather than global. Malaria control is a
case in point [33](p. 23); since malaria is primarily a dis-
ease of poor regions, this fact may account for the serious
underfunding of or attention to malaria control on the
part of the industrialized world [34].
Whether global or regional, many public goods for health,
such as communicable disease control (including vaccina-
tion) and control of antibiotic resistance, are conspicu-
ously undersupplied in the marketplace, reflecting the
"dramatic decay in local and global public health capac-
ity" identified by the United Nations High Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change [35]. In theory scientific
knowledge is a quintessential public good, yet in practice
it is often ring-fenced by mechanisms such as intellectual
property rights. This is arguably both cause and conse-
quence of increased reliance on private financing of
health research: in 2001, private for-profit companies
spent $51.2 billion on health research, as against $46.6
billion in public spending [36](p. x), but as noted in the
second article of this series priorities for privately financed
research are more likely to be shaped by anticipated profit
than by contribution to reducing the global burden of dis-
ease. A further complication arises from the fact that
potential for commercialization is an increasingly impor-
tant consideration for at least some national, publicly
financed health research granting agencies. Commercially
oriented research priorities are likely entirely to ignore
interventions both within and outside the health sector
that address disparities in SDH, since such interventions
are intrinsically not amenable to commercialization.
Thus, it is imperative to develop new mechanisms for
financing health research that do not rely on the anticipa-
tion of profit and avoid the resulting skewing of priorities;
reform of national and international intellectual property
regimes is arguably a part of such necessary reforms [37-
39], but just a part (see e.g. [40]).
Expanding and improving development assistance
The need for more resources for health systems and to
support provision of health-related public goods is just
one argument among many for increasing the value of
official development assistance (ODA). ODA is the most
visible and conspicuous transfer of resources from rich to
poor countries, although it is far from being the single
largest contributor to international financial flows. The
UN Millennium Project and the UK Commission for
Africa each concluded that an approximate doubling of
current ODA spending is necessary, although not suffi-
cient, if much of the developing world is to have a chance
of achieving the MDGs [12,13]. The Millennium Project
report was also noteworthy for recommending major
changes in how ODA spending is directed in order to
increase its relevance to the MDGs, thereby lending sup-
port to long-standing criticisms of aid agencies for provid-
ing assistance for specific projects rather than as general
budget support and for the multiple reporting require-
ments they demand of recipients [13](p. 193–210). At
their 2005 Summit, the G8 countries committed them-
selves to an additional $25 billion in development assist-
ance to Africa by 2010; this commitment can be read as a
direct response to the report of the Commission of Africa,
which was part of the British Prime Minister's initiative to
situate African development as one of the main items on
the Summit's agenda. It remains to be seen how effectively
the G8 will live up to the Gleneagles aid commitments,
and whether the increase will come at the expense of aid
flows to other regions of the world, where national-level
statistical indicators may be less bleak but poverty and
other deficiencies in access to SDH are nevertheless wide-
spread.
Some commentators were and are sceptical about the
value of these commitments for a different reason. They
argue that domestic governance failures, capacity limita-
tions, and the tendency of African countries in particular
toward "neopatrimonial systems of rule" [41] will render
such inflows ineffective if not destructive [42,43]. The
Commission for Africa and the Millennium Project each
examined the evidence and made numerous recommen-
dations for improving the effectiveness with which aid is
used to achieve the MDGs and similar objectives, which
cannot be reviewed in this series. More importantly
though, each initiative directly challenged fashionable
scepticism about the value of development assistance, cru-
cially emphasizing donor policies and practices as con-
straints on aid effectiveness. The Millennium Project
report further pointed out the irony that "the notion of
taking the [Millennium Development] Goals seriously
remains highly unorthodox among development practi-
tioners" because of a lack of financial support from the
industrialized world [13](p. 202). In a direct rejection of
received wisdom that weak governance or "absorptive
capacity" constraints seriously limit the potential benefits
from short-term increases in development assistance, its
discussion of Africa concluded that the quality of govern-
ance in African countries is comparable to that in other
regions with similarly low incomes, noting that "good
Globalization and Health 2007, 3:7 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/7
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governance requires resources for wages, training, infor-
mation systems, and so forth" [13](p. 146).
Important changes in delivery mechanisms and funding
criteria to improve the effectiveness of aid in contributing
to health equity can and should be made (see e.g. [44]).
However, it is to be hoped that the Millennium Project
and the Commission for Africa have decisively shifted the
burden of proof to those resisting substantial new ODA
commitments to show how meaningful improvements in
health equity and access to SDH can be achieved in the
absence of such commitments, and to the rich countries
to demonstrate mechanisms for making the necessary
resources available without compromising their effective-
ness through ties to their own economic and strategic
interests.
Expanding debt relief and taking poverty reduction (more) 
seriously
External debt remains perhaps the most serious constraint
on aid's effectiveness: " [D]ozens of heavily indebted poor
and middle-income countries are forced by creditor gov-
ernments to spend large parts of their limited tax receipts
on debt service, undermining their ability to finance
investments in human capital and infrastructure. In a
pointless and debilitating churning of resources, the cred-
itors provide development assistance with one hand and
then withdraw it in debt servicing with the other" [13](p.
35). In every region of the developing world except sub-
Saharan Africa, inflows of development assistance are
more than offset by the annual outflow of debt service
payments to external creditors (Figure 1), and in sub-
Saharan Africa the high percentage of many government
budgets accounted for by development assistance means
that any drain on scarce financial resource to service exter-
nal debt represents a serious constraint. Over the last ten
years, the rich countries have offered gradually increasing
levels of debt cancellation to a limited number of the
world's poorest countries through the Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Although debt cancella-
tion for HIPCs has made possible increases in public
spending on such basic needs as health and education in
several recipient countries [45], many HIPCs have seen
only modest decreases in their debt service obligations,
and three have actually seen increases [46](p. 148). In
addition, the eligible countries are not those where a
majority of the world's poor people live: many other
countries are not statistically desperate enough to qualify,
despite high levels of poverty and high external debt bur-
den [47,48]. Both limitations arise from the fact that a
"sustainable" debt load has been defined for purposes of
the HIPC initiative with reference to a ratio of debt service
to annual export revenues, based on what have often
turned out to be optimistic projections of export earnings
and commodity prices.
This debt sustainability criterion was adopted at the insist-
ence of the G7, "balancing the need to include strategic
G7 allies and the desire to help keep costs down" [49](p.
17–18). Various refinements of this criterion are now
under consideration [46](p. 152–154), but none explic-
itly incorporates the alternative principle of working back-
ward from the value of government expenditure required
to meet basic needs, and only then determining how
much (if any) of the public budget can be devoted to debt
repayment [50-52]. The Millennium Project echoed many
earlier critiques in recommending that: "'Debt sustaina-
bility' should be redefined as 'the level of debt consistent
with achieving the Millennium Development Goals,'
arriving in 2015 without a new debt overhang. For many
heavily indebted poor countries this will require 100 per-
cent debt cancellation. For many heavily indebted mid-
dle-income countries this will require more debt relief
than has been on offer" [13](p. 207–208). Thus, expand-
ing both the availability of debt relief and its value must
be a priority from the standpoint of health equity and
SDH.
At the 2005 Summit, the G8 committed themselves to
increasing the value of debt relief by cancelling all debts
owed by HIPCs to the World Bank, IMF and the conces-
sional (i.e., low-interest) arm of the African Development
Bank once the relevant countries reach the HIPC comple-
tion point. "To reach completion point, countries must
maintain macroeconomic stability under a PRGF-sup-
ported program, carry out key structural and social
reforms, and implement a Poverty Reduction Strategy sat-
isfactorily for one year," after which debt relief is provided
by the creditors that have signed up for the HIPC initiative
[53](accessed May 13, 2006; PRGF is the Poverty Reduc-
tion and Growth Facility, formerly the Enhanced Struc-
Debt service and development assistance, by region, 2000–2003Figure 1
Debt service and development assistance, by region, 2000–
2003. Source: World Bank Data from Econstats http://
www.econstats.com/wb/V392.htm and http://www.econ-
stats.com/wb/V546.htm; accessed February, 2007).
Debt service outflows 
Development assistance 
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US $ (billions) 
  Sub-Saharan Africa 
  South Asia 
  Middle East and North Africa 
     Latin America 
  East Asia and the Pacific 
     
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tural Adjustment Facility, of the IMF). The 2005 Summit
commitment, now formalized as the Multilateral Debt
Relief Initiative (MDRI), was a welcome next step, as was
a separate partial debt cancellation deal for Nigeria esti-
mated to be worth $31 billion [54]. However, the reliabil-
ity of the MDRI commitment is called into question by
the fact that as of mid-2005, existing (i.e. pre-Summit)
debt cancellation commitments under HIPC were under-
funded by approximately $12.3 billion, and were facing
non-participation by many commercial creditors [46](p.
146) Further, additional debt relief under MDRI will be at
least partly offset by reductions in development assistance
[55], thus repeating the shell game in which development
assistance declined substantially in the late 1990s after the
start of the original HIPC initiative [56](p. 6–7). Indeed,
because development assistance spending for 2005
includes major one-off debt cancellations for Iraq and
Nigeria, without further new commitments (which have
not yet been forthcoming), overall ODA spending may
actually decline in 2006, for which data are not yet avail-
able, and 2007 [57].
As noted in the second article of the series, in order to
qualify for debt relief under HIPC, national governments
have had to prepare Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs) for approval by the World Bank and IMF, and to
update them periodically. Although the process offers
great potential benefit, in practice direct parallels exist
between the PRSP process of qualifying for debt relief and
earlier forms of conditionality [58,59]; recent studies con-
firm the continuity of the macroeconomic principles
embodied in PRSPs with the earlier era of structural
adjustment [60-62]. For example, PRSPs may include
"trade-related conditions that are more stringent, in terms
of requiring more, or faster, or deeper liberalization, than
WTO provisions to which the respective country has
agreed" [63](p. 20). Even if one rejects the position that
PRSPs are being used quite cynically as a vehicle to pry
open developing country markets, it appears that the
lending institutions that demand and assess PRSPs con-
tinue to operate on the uncritical presumption that devel-
opment is best achieved through rapid integration into
the global economy, without consideration of economic
distribution or health equity impacts.
Further questions about the architecture of development
assistance and debt relief involve effects on public health
and education budgets of the expenditure ceilings on
which the IMF, in particular, is reported to insist as ele-
ments of PRSPs and macroeconomic management plans,
even when the necessary resources have been committed
by external donors. The economic rationale involves lim-
iting inflation and currency appreciation, with the latter
viewed with special concern because it could reduce the
competitiveness of a country's exports and hence its abil-
ity to repay external debts. A 2005 article based on previ-
ous research and the field experience of one of the authors
identified this constraint as operating in a number of
countries including Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda
[64,65]. In response, World Bank and IMF officials argued
that Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs)
incorporating public sector expenditure ceilings "are not a
reflection of some malign intent," but rather "state what
money is available and what programmes are possible
within the context of that resource envelope" [66]. They
provided no country-specific evidence to counter the argu-
ment that such expenditure ceilings are compromising
national governments' ability to meet basic needs. Subse-
quent analyses [65,67] have strengthened the case against
expenditure ceilings. A full assessment is difficult given
the lack of transparency and the asymmetrical nature of
relations between the IMF and national governments.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the IMF approach does not
reflect a willingness to revisit past policy choices and
address present-day asymmetries in resources and bar-
gaining power that together determine "what money is
available" to a particular society or national government:
say, one in sub-Saharan Africa trying to deal simultane-
ously with declining commodity prices, the impact of the
HIV-AIDS epidemic, and the legacy of capital flight facili-
tated by hospitable financial centres in the developed
world.
Finally, it is important to challenge the legitimacy of exter-
nal creditors' financial claims when they involve repay-
ment of funds lent to governments that systematically
looted the public treasury or used public funds (including
those supplied by external borrowers) for domestic
repression in order to maintain power. Pogge [68] ques-
tions the legitimacy of these debts on ethical grounds,
since the international community need not have permit-
ted violently repressive or larcenous rulers to borrow
against the assets and future earnings of their subjects,
which is what they did in many cases. Other commenta-
tors have similarly questioned whether "odious debts" are
collectible as a matter of international law [69,70]. The
international community remains obstinate in its failure
to confront this question, which needs to be explored
with special urgency in cases where the imperative of
repaying external creditors threatens to conflict with
domestic public expenditure priorities related to health
equity and SDH. In our view, and that of other commen-
tators on debt issues [47,52,71,72], the latter must always
take priority, and the onus is now on the industrialized
countries individually and collectively to develop con-
crete policy responses.
Making trade policy development-friendly
Something close to a new conventional wisdom has
grown up around the relation between trade and develop-
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ment. Organizations otherwise as divergent in their per-
spectives as Oxfam and the World Bank apparently agree
on the value to developing economies, especially the
world's poorest countries, of access to industrialized
world markets – sometimes citing figures to the effect that
annual gains from complete liberalization of trade would
amount to several times the value of development assist-
ance [73,74]. Because markets for agricultural commodi-
ties are economically critical for many developing
countries agricultural subsidies, which simultaneously
lower prices within the borders of the producing country
and enable producers to export at artificially low prices,
are a special concern. So, too, is the continuing use of tar-
iff escalation on high value-added or manufactured
exports from poorer nations by industrialized countries,
in contrast to low or zero tariffs on raw commodity
exports. Improved access to developed country markets
for manufactured products could yield very substantial
income gains for the developing world [75,76], although
estimating the value of potential markets lost to develop-
ing country producers as a result of subsidies and trade
restrictions is fraught with difficulty [77].
Birdsall and colleagues [78] question the new conven-
tional wisdom. They argue, unfortunately without sup-
porting documentation, that the effects of agricultural
subsidies on international prices of commodities such as
cotton are far too small to affect the competitiveness of
developing country producers in their own or export mar-
kets. While reserving judgment on this argument, it must
be acknowledged that the relations between agricultural
subsidies as defined and prospects for development are
more complicated than acknowledged by many partici-
pants in the debates [77,79,80]. Although improved mar-
ket access may increase the incomes of developing country
agricultural producers who are already part of the cash
economy, it is likely to have little benefit for larger num-
bers of producers who are primarily oriented toward sub-
sistence, with occasional local market sales – the problem
of "two agricultures" [80]; see also [81]. The entire issue of
agricultural trade and SDH requires "a more fine-grained
approach, which would differentiate among crops and
countries" [82](p. 45). In the aftermath of the collapse of
WTO negotiations in July, 2006 because of failure to make
progress on agricultural subsidies, that prospect is perhaps
more remote than ever.
Apart from the specifics of agricultural trade, multiple iro-
nies surround the relation between contemporary trade
policy priorities and the ability of developing countries to
meet basic needs related to SDH. At a theoretical level,
"the arguments advanced in favour of trade liberalization
as a way of facilitating learning and productivity growth
call for support and protection in the early stages of large
scale, specialized enterprises, not full exposure of them to
foreign competition" [75](p. 10). This strategy was
adopted, with variations, by countries such as China,
Korea and Vietnam that are now held up as exemplars of
the benefits of globalization: they opened up their mar-
kets to imports selectively as their previously protected
industries matured, and adopted intellectual property
regimes that favoured domestic producers, just as Euro-
pean and North American countries had done a century
earlier [78,83,84]. Not only current bilateral and multilat-
eral trade agreements but also informal pressure from the
industrialized world may now preclude similar develop-
ment strategies by later industrializers [85,86]: the reason
economist Ha-Joon Chang refers to the trade policy stance
adopted by the industrialized countries as "kicking away
the ladder."
Two examples suffice to show the importance of this
dynamic for development – and thus, by implication, for
SDH. First, as noted earlier PRSPs have been used as a
source of leverage for import liberalization, without con-
sidering impact on countries' ability to meet basic needs
related to health. Second, provisions for Special and Dif-
ferential Treatment (SDT) have been a feature of the world
trading regime since the early postwar years; they embody
recognition of the distinctive needs of countries at vastly
different stages of economic development. However the
SDT provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) were seriously weakened, in terms of their
value for developing economies, with the advent of the
WTO. Intense lobbying by African and Asian countries led
to a commitment by WTO members in 2001 to review "all
Special and Differential provisions...with a view to
strengthening them and making them more precise, effec-
tive and operational" [87](¶44, emphasis added). But
what should count as strengthening? The fundamental
question is whether SDT provisions should be considered
temporary measures to facilitate the integration of devel-
oping economies into today's trade policy regime, or
whether "the bottom-line question for the WTO should
be what it can do to facilitate development, not what it is
willing to allow to ease adjustment" [88](p. 300). This
issue remains unresolved, and arises even more acutely
with respect to the proliferation of bilateral and regional
trade negotiations and agreements [89](pp. 27–56). In
such negotiations and relationships, disparities in bar-
gaining power and resources may be even more glaring
than at the WTO. As a result, "WTO-plus" provisions
emerging from these settings may vitiate whatever gains in
terms of market access and domestic policy flexibility that
developing countries are able to secure within the WTO
framework [90]. This is a special concern given the likeli-
hood that bilateral and regional negotiations will become
even more important following the events of July 2006.
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Treating health as a human right: What does that mean?
The international body of human rights law, starting with
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
includes various provisions related to health and SDH.
These include Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Article 24(1) of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (1989/90), Article 5(e)(iv) of the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (1965/1969) and Articles 11(f) and 12 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women (1979/1981). Most notably, Arti-
cle 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights proclaims "the right of everyone to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of phys-
ical and mental health," and obligates States Parties to
ensure "provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate
and of infant mortality and for the healthy development
of the child; the improvement of all aspects of environ-
mental and industrial hygiene; the prevention, treatment
and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and
other diseases; and the creation of conditions which
would assure to all medical service and medical attention
in the event of sickness." (The United States has not rati-
fied this Convention.) Although state obligations are lim-
ited to the progressive realization of the human right to
health in the context of their "available resources" (Article
2), all states must show measurable progress towards its
full realization. Assessing the extent of such progress
requires evidence of effort to reach health goals, and of
empirically grounded links between social and economic
policy and health status trends within and between states.
In 2000 the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights issued General Comment 14 on Article 12,
which both clarified the scope of the right to health and
identified the obligations of states parties to respect, pro-
tect and fulfil the right [91]. General Comment 14 inter-
preted the right to health as an inclusive right that
encompasses not only timely and appropriate health care,
but also key underlying health determinants, including
"access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation,
an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing,
healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and
access to health-related education and information,
including on sexual and reproductive health" (¶11). It fur-
ther identified "core obligations" that include ensuring
access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-dis-
criminatory basis; to ensure access to minimum essential
food and freedom from hunger; to ensure access to basic
shelter, housing, sanitation and potable water; to provide
essential drugs as defined by the World Health Organiza-
tion Access Programme on Essential Drugs; and to adopt
and implement a national public health strategy (¶43). It
described the Article 12 obligations related to maternal
and child health, industrial hygiene, and disease preven-
tion and control as "obligations of comparable priority"
(¶44). (For explication of Article 12 and General Com-
ment 14, see [92-98].)
What would public policies that recognize health as a
human right look like, and what might they mean for
SDH? The question can usefully be considered in terms of
potential impacts of trade policy on access to SDH. The
United Nations' Special Rapporteurs on globalization and
human rights concluded that "it is necessary to move
away from approaches that are ad hoc and contingent" in
ensuring that human rights are not compromised by trade
liberalization [99](¶25). A more extensive inquiry was
conducted by the Special Rapporteur on the Article 12
right to health (appointed in 2002, reappointed for a sec-
ond term in 2005), whose first report adopted an expan-
sive approach that links poverty reduction and the right to
health [93]. A more recent report, dealing specifically with
the WTO, found that "the progressive realization of the
right to health and the immediate obligations to which it
is subject, place reasonable conditions on the trade rules
and policies that may be chosen" [94](¶24). Conse-
quently, the report recommended inter alia "that urgent
attention be given to the development of a methodology
for right to health impact assessments in the context of
trade" [94](¶74) – a challenge that is best viewed as part
of the larger imperative of balancing the inherently com-
mercial objectives of trade agreements with other social
objectives such as poverty elimination [100].
WHO research has found that litigation to establish access
to essential medicines as an actionable human right can
succeed, mainly in situations where constitutional provi-
sions entrench the right to health and/or acknowledge the
primacy of international human rights agreements with
respect to domestic policies and legislation [101]. The
cases studied did not involve the provisions of trade agree-
ments, although the intellectual property provisions of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPs) remain central to debates about access to
essential medicines despite a WTO interpretation that
apparently offers flexibility with respect to compulsory
licensing and parallel imports [102-107]. Neither did they
address the more challenging question of how the right to
health can be used to secure more equitable and wide-
spread access to SDH such as adequate nutrition or safe
water, which is specifically addressed in one of the MDG
targets.
Indeed, the availability of safe water has often been
reduced for the poor or otherwise vulnerable when costs
rose as a consequence of privatization or the implementa-
tion of cost recovery measures [108-112]. Because it is
essential to health, " [t]here are compelling arguments for
viewing access to water as a human right," and water as a
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good whose commodification and commercialization
should be limited [113](p. 567). On the other hand, this
position is far from universally accepted; "the struggle per-
sists because of reluctance among powerful players to
acknowledge that principles of social and economic jus-
tice must not be sacrificed for reasons related to wider
political economy" [113](p. 568). In another example
with potentially far-reaching policy relevance, Ham-
monds and Ooms [97] have argued that many policies
pursued by the World Bank, including expenditure ceil-
ings and some aspects of loan conditionalities, lead to vio-
lations of member countries' obligations related to the
right to health. How would this claim be adjudicated, and
how would conclusions be implemented? These ques-
tions underscore the importance of a lack of implementa-
tion mechanisms – an issue that is unlikely soon to be
resolved. Thus, the right to health as a counterweight to
the priorities of the global marketplace offers important
opportunities, but also formidable conceptual and practi-
cal challenges.
The need to protect and expand "policy space"
"Policy space" has been defined as "freedom to choose the
best mix of policies possible for achieving sustainable and
equitable economic development given [developing
countries'] unique and individual social, political, eco-
nomic and environmental conditions" [114]. The concept
is most often invoked with respect to how trade agree-
ments constrain economic policy choices [100,115-117].
However, the effects of trade policy commitments on
national policy space are not limited to those associated
with the actual texts of trade agreements. For example,
once such agreements have facilitated the reorganization
of production across multiple national borders, govern-
ments' policy space is subsequently limited by the ability
of a parent or lead firm to play off subsidiaries or inde-
pendent contractors in multiple national jurisdictions
against one another in order to minimize costs and maxi-
mize productivity. The effect of US retail giant Wal-Mart's
procurement practices on suppliers in the developing
world is sometimes cited as a case in point [118], but this
is arguably just an especially conspicuous example of a
dynamic and a concentration of power that is intrinsic to
buyer-driven commodity chains [119-121].
Liberalization of financial markets enhances the power of
the owners of financial assets relative to governments
because of the (often implicit) threat of disinvestment.
This process is familiar from the role of bond markets and
credit rating agencies in defining the risks (to investors,
not necessarily to residents of the country in question)
associated with a particular government's policies, and
therefore determining the interest rates bondholders will
demand [122-124]. Fiscal discipline is also exercised in
other ways; the implications for policies related to SDH
can be understood starting from the premise that even
when sustained economic growth is achieved, it cannot be
assumed that gains from growth will be widely shared in
ways that reduce poverty and other forms of vulnerability.
Explicitly redistributive policies may be necessary.
As an illustration of this point, a recent study constructed
alternative scenarios of progress by 18 Latin American and
Caribbean countries – a region of the world where ine-
quality is among the highest, on a variety of dimensions
[125] – toward the MDG of reducing extreme poverty by
50 percent between 1990 and 2015. The study found "that
even very small reductions in inequality can have very
large positive impacts in terms of poverty reduction. For
most countries considered, a one- or two-point reduction
in the Gini coefficient," which is a standard measure of
income inequality across an entire society, "would achieve
the same reduction in the incidence of poverty as many
years of positive economic growth" [126](p. 13). This rep-
resents an application at the country level of the New Eco-
nomics Foundation's insight about the relative
ineffectiveness of growth in reducing poverty worldwide,
discussed in the second article of the series. In other
words: even a little economic redistribution could go a long way
toward reducing inequalities in access to SDH, especially
if redistributive policies were combined with carefully
designed publicly financed health system and educational
interventions.
The nature of redistributive policies is that someone
within the borders of the nation-state in question has to
pay for them. The constraint on policy space that arises
from the need to raise tax revenues to finance such meas-
ures, once again in the Latin American context, is suc-
cinctly described by Williamson, codifier of the
"Washington consensus" on development policy [127]
which throughout the 1990s focused on domestic deregu-
lation and rapid integration of national economies into
the global marketplace. " [I]t would not be practical,"
writes Williamson, "to push this very far, because too
many of the Latin rich have the option of placing too
many of their assets in Miami" [128]. The operation of
this constraint is not limited to Latin America: financial
deregulation and the increased mobility of financial assets
have enabled the propertied worldwide to join "a sort of
global, cross-border economic electorate, where the right
to vote is predicated on the possibility of registering capi-
tal" [129](p. 40).
Evidence that interjurisdictional competition has already
reduced fiscal capacity and constrained the ability of gov-
ernments to increase the progressivity of taxation and
improve the effectiveness of tax collection is inconclusive
[130-132]. The former Chief of the IMF's Public Finance
Division has predicted that this constraint will clearly
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arise in the future [133]; he has identified several "fiscal
termites" including inability to tax financial capital,
accounting flexibilities associated with intrafirm trade
across national borders, the proliferation of derivatives
and hedge funds, and the cross-border mobility of high
income earners [134] that will limit fiscal capacity and
start chewing on the foundations of tax systems in coun-
tries rich and poor alike (see also [135,136]). For some
observers, the ideal remedy would be multilateral agree-
ment on the creation of a system for global taxation and
redistribution of resources across national borders, such
as the long-standing proposal for a tax on currency trans-
actions – the "Tobin tax" – or more recent proposals for
taxes on carbon emissions or air travel [137-141]. France
has now adopted a tax on air tickets, the progressivity of
which is maintained by a much higher tax on business
class tickets, with proceeds dedicated to supporting pur-
chase of drugs to treat AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in
developing countries [142]; 13 other countries have
signed on to this proposal [143]. It remains to be seen
whether the existence of this levy will create a political
obstacle to increasing development assistance from gen-
eral revenues in the industrialized world, and such pur-
pose-specific funds are no substitute for the larger scale
global redistribution that some would argue is ethically
imperative.
This necessarily brief discussion suggests a rather bleak
conclusion. Redistributive policies of various kinds are
likely to be needed to reduce health inequities within and
between countries. Globalization tends to be associated
with a long-term trend toward increasing economic ine-
quality and increasing attachment to markets as a mecha-
nism for allocating resources and setting policy priorities.
At the same time, globalization generates constraints on
the ability of national and sub-national governments to
implement the policies that would mitigate or compen-
sate for those impacts. Identifying 'success stories' of effec-
tive interventions is therefore especially important.
However, it must to be asked whether the interventions in
question are genuinely improving health equity, or are
simply undoing some of the damage done by integration
into the global marketplace, and how sustainable they are
in view of pressures toward (for example) labour market
flexibility and tax competitiveness.
Because of the limited universe of case studies (how many
governments in the world have actively and aggressively
been concerned with reducing health inequity?) and the
associated need to rely on counterfactuals (what would
have happened if they had been more concerned?), much
is not known about the policy space for measures to
reduce health equity by way of addressing the social deter-
minants of health. Scenario construction and analysis
may be the best way of reducing this knowledge gap, and
it is a central element in a multi-year team project on glo-
balization and health disparities in major Canadian met-
ropolitan areas that is now getting under way. The authors
are respectively principal investigator and co-investigator
on this study, which involves an additional 18 co-investi-
gators from a total of 10 universities, as well as a number
of collaborators and consultants from civil society organ-
izations.
Conclusion: SDH and values for the global community
Jeffrey Sachs has noted that "in a world of trillions of dol-
lars of income every year, the amount of money that you
need to address the health crises is easily available in the
world" [144](p. 3). Scarcity of resources, in any absolute
sense, is not the issue. Rather, the issue is one of whether
and how resources necessary to meet the basic needs of
the world's majority will be mobilized rapidly and effec-
tively.
Studying the key elements of contemporary globalization
leads one to contrast two fundamentally distinct visions
of the future, which often are only implicit in policy dis-
cussions and are presented here in stylized form.
In the first vision, individuals, households, and national
economies have to 'earn their keep' in the global market-
place. This offers major opportunities for some, and
major risks – exemplified by long-term unemployment,
economic insecurity and marginalization, and cata-
strophic illness – for others. This vision does not preclude
social policy interventions, but they must be justified in
terms of the return on investment. Investing in health (the
mantra of the Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health) is defended with reference to evidence of the pay-
offs in improving the ability of individuals, households
and societies to compete in the global marketplace. The
triages that are implicitly accepted in the vocabulary of
investing in health in developing countries have received
too little attention from development and population
health researchers.
More broadly, this first vision redefines social protection
as "social risk management," in the words of a World
Bank strategy document advocating "a new conceptualiza-
tion of social protection that is better aligned with current
worldwide realities" [145](p. 1, 9). The initial presump-
tion is that " [i]n an ideal world with perfectly symmetri-
cal information and complete, well-functioning markets,
all risk management arrangements can and should be
market-based (except for the incapacitated) [145](p. 16).
The fundamental task of social policy is redefined in radi-
cally individualistic terms, as helping households "to
smooth their consumption patterns" in response to exog-
enous events ranging from natural disasters to financial
crises [145] (p. vii-ix). Governmental intervention to help
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the non-incapacitated poor is justified only when "market
failures" result from the fact that the poor "are more vul-
nerable than other population groups because they are
typically more exposed to risk and have little access to
appropriate risk management instruments" [145] (p 10).
Because the norms of the market are taken as given, no
attention is paid either to normative considerations of
social justice or to the empirical question of how (for
example) promotion of trade liberalization and financial
integration has facilitated capital mobility in search of
lower production costs, thereby allowing investors to cre-
ate the "worldwide realities" that are invoked to justify a
new generation of domestic social and economic policies
to integrate people and countries into the global market-
place.
The second vision seeks to blunt the negative impact of
the emerging global marketplace. This vision, which lacks
codifiers as authoritative and well financed as institutions
like the World Bank, incorporates such perspectives as:
o Institutionalized recognition of at least minimal
access to the material prerequisites for health as a
human right, with corollary claims against available
resources;
o the call of the International Labour Office's World
Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globaliza-
tion for a new form of globalization that recognizes
social obligations and incorporates new institutions
for global governance [146];
o the reference by international relations and human
rights scholar Richard Falk [147] to "a regulatory
framework for global market forces that is people-cen-
tred rather than capital-driven" (p. 18);
o the invocation by Michael Marmot, now Chair of the
Commission on Social Determinants of Health, of
"public policy based on a vision of the world where
people matter and social justice is paramount"
[148](p. 1099); and
o despite its conceptual shortcomings, the idea of a
"global social contract" analogous to the social con-
tract within industrialized countries that supports con-
temporary welfare states [16].
The formidable barriers to implementing the second
vision we have identified can be understood, in part, by
unpacking the social contract analogy. A long and some-
times violent history of political conflicts (notably, but
not exclusively, between capital and labour) preceded the
implicit contract that underpins many contemporary wel-
fare states and legal frameworks for industrial relations.
Those conflicts were resolved, and the implicit contracts
forged, in a context where national boundaries largely
defined the options available to all parties. Today, given
the shifts of bargaining power that have accompanied the
emergence of contemporary globalization, it is not certain
that (for instance) investors with the option of capital
flight or the managers of transnational corporations
would see the need for such contracts ... and they are
meanwhile unravelling domestically in many high-
income welfare states, especially Anglo-American ones
(see e.g. [149,150]).
Another set of barriers to implementation in the context
of trade policy has been identified by Stiglitz & Charlton
[18], who noted that living up to the rhetorical identifica-
tion of the multilateral negotiations that began in 2001 as
a "development round" was likely to require "a funda-
mental departure from the system of mercantilism,"
driven by considerations of national interest or by the eco-
nomic interests of particularly powerful economic actors
within nations (p. 496). The apparent collapse of WTO
negotiations in July 2006 underscored the magnitude of
that departure, and the generic difficulty in using what is
essentially an ethical argument in matters of international
relations. However, the alternative to the use of such argu-
ments in support of economic, social and foreign policies
that are conducive to health equity and improving the
social determinants of health is the implied position that
growth through marketization will benefit everyone in the
long term and whatever health damage occurs in the
interim must be accepted as the price of progress. Stated
in this manner, the position makes consideration of issues
of distributive justice unavoidable – hence, returning us to
the concept of health equity with which the series of arti-
cles began.
This discussion suggests a provocative parallel: in both
trade policy and human rights, institutions and norms of
global governance have emerged. A crucial difference
between the two is that no multilaterally agreed upon
implementation and enforcement mechanisms exist with
respect to human rights that are even roughly comparable
to dispute resolution procedures under trade agreements.
Exploring the political possibilities for developing such
mechanisms organized around the right to health, or
some alternative concept that embodies a comparable
challenge to the norms of the global marketplace, would
require an additional article (or series of articles). The task
remains urgent, and we conclude by quoting an axiom
about contemporary globalization that applies among as
well as within nations: "At the very least ... those who
stand to benefit from the process should be expected to
agree to provide systematic and substantial assistance to
the victims, presumably via government channels, and
supported liberally by the wealthier communities. If that
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is not acceptable politically, there is surely little that can
be said convincingly in support of a contention that the
suffering of the victims will be justified by the promised
future benefits to their descendants" [151] (p. 430).
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